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BEPS AND THE TCJA 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah 
The University of Michigan 
ABSTRACT 
US international tax law is commonly conceived as developed in the US and influencing the 
development of other countries' international tax law. This paper will argue that in the case of 
the TCJA, the US legislation was heavily influenced by the OECD BEPS project, and that the 
continuing OECD work in Pillars I and II is likely to have a similar influence on the future 
development of US international tax law. 
1. Introduction
From its inception, the international tax regime was heavily influenced by the United
States. The regime is traditionally traced back to the work of the four economists for the
League of Nations in 1923, who came up with the original compromise underlying the
tax treaty network, i.e., that passive income should be taxed primarily at residence and
active income primarily at source (the “benefits principle”). Arguably, this compromise
between the claims of residence and source countries was made possible by the US
unilateral adoption of the foreign tax credit in 1918, because the US (already the world’s
largest capital exporter) was (unlike the UK) willing to cede taxing jurisdiction to the
source by allowing a dollar for dollar credit (originally without limitation). Edwin
Seligman, the US representative to the four economists, used the credit to persuade
them to adopt the benefits principle. In addition, because the US rejected exemption to
alleviate double taxation, it laid the ground work for the single tax principle, first
embodied in the original League of Nations model treaty of 1927 (e.g., imposing
withholding tax on interest unless it was taxed at residence).
This state of affairs continued up through and including the Great Recession of 2008-
2010, which brought us FATCA and its international progeny the CRS. But in the past
decade the direction of influence has been reversed. The original OECD BEPS project
(BEPS 1) of 2013-2015 was led by the EU, not by the US, and its influence can be seen in
both the 2016 US model and the TCJA. The current BEPS effort (BEPS 2) is also primarily
led by Europe in Pillar I, which reacts to the adoption of DSTs, but the influence of TCJA
can be seen in Pillar 2. However, Pillar 2 is an improvement of the TCJA and is likely in
turn to influence reform of the TCJA. The current state of play can thus be characterized
as a constructive dialogue between the US and the EU (and not, as some would claim, a
“tax war”).
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In what follows, I will first describe the traditional US role of constructive unilateralism 
(part 2), then discuss BEPS 1 and the 2016 US model (part 3), then turn to the TCJA (part 
4). Part 5 concludes by discussing how BEPS 2 can if it succeeds lead to further US 
reforms.  
 
2. The Traditional US Role: Constructive Unilateralism, 1918-2010. 
 
Traditionally, the US has been a leader, not a follower, in international taxation. This 
part describes ten instances of US international tax leadership from 1918 to 2010, all of 
which were adopted by the US unilaterally but then followed by other countries and/or 
the OECD. 
 
a. The Foreign Tax Credit  
 
Following the end of World War I, capital importing and capital exporting countries 
engaged in a vociferous debate on who should bear the burden of preventing double 
taxation of cross-border income. Capital exporters like the UK called for abolishing 
source-based taxation, and would at best give a deduction for foreign taxes. Capital 
importers like Italy argued for territorial taxation. 
  
The US was already the world’s leading capital exporter in 1918. Despite that, it adopted 
a middle position- impose world-wide taxation, but give a foreign tax credit for taxes 
imposed at source (limited from 1921 to the US tax rate, lest it incentivize source 
countries to raise their rates at the expense of the US Treasury). The US rejected 
territoriality because it would lead to non-taxation of income that was not taxed at 
source. But it also rejected the UK view that only a deduction should be available for 
foreign taxes, because that would lead to preference for domestic over foreign 
investment (since the foreign tax would be an added burden even if it were deductible).  
 
What explains the US position, as compared to the UK one? The answer presumably lies 
in the different relationship of business and government in the two countries. The US 
position was the one that took care of the interest of the fisc but also respected the 
needs of US multinationals to avoid double taxation, while the UK only addressed its 
fiscal needs (of course, the US could also afford to be more generous).  
 
When Columbia Professor Edwin Seligman attended the meetings of the four 
economists appointed by the League of Nations to study this issue in 1923, he was 
therefore in a good position to broker a compromise between the positions of the 
capital exporters and importers. The result was that primacy was given to the tax of the 
source country on active income, but not on passive income, and the foreign tax credit 
became the norm for worldwide jurisdictions.  
 
It is commonly argued that most other OECD members are territorial, but this is a 
mistake. Territoriality merely means that dividends from active income are not taxed 
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upon repatriation. But most “territorial” jurisdictions now have CFC rules, which mean 
that they tax some types of income currently with a foreign tax credit. It is hard to find 
any purely territorial jurisdictions among our major trading partners.  
 
Thus, I believe that the foreign tax credit is our first example of US constructive 
unilateralism. The US adopted it unilaterally without the need for a treaty, and most 
major jurisdictions followed suit. In the absence of unilateral US action, it is likely that 
the international tax regime would not have arisen, and a lot of double taxation would 
have been the result.  
 
In recent years, some academics have called for abolishing the US Foreign Tax Credit 
and replacing it with a deduction. Prof. Shaviro, for example, has proposed such a 
regime, in which the problem of double taxation is addressed by adjusting the US tax 
rate on foreign source income so that a deduction achieves the same neutrality 
between domestic and foreign investment as a credit. But even assuming that such 
adjustments are possible on an ongoing basis, it seems to me that Shaviro ignores the 
likely response of our trading partners. If we abandon the credit, so would others, and it 
is hard to imagine a situation in which this would not result in disincentives to cross-
border investment since it is impossible to adjust all the rates at the same time. The 
entire edifice built into the treaties of either giving a credit or an exemption would in all 
probability not survive such a unilateral US move. Constructive unilateralism would be 
replaced by destructive unilateralism.  
 
b. Foreign Investment Funds  
 
The US adopted the first Foreign Investment Fund, or “incorporated pocketbook”, 
legislation as the foreign personal holding company (FPHC) rules in 1935. The legislation 
was a result of hearings that revealed numerous instances of wealthy US individuals 
transferring passive income to foreign corporations that they controlled. While the FPHC 
rules were abolished in 2004, they were replaced by the even more stringent Passive 
Foreign Investment Company (PFIC) rules from 1986 onward. The PFIC rules are 
remarkable because they do not require control from the US. Most of the recent 
criminal tax evasion convictions of US resident individuals come about because they do 
not comply with the PFIC rules when setting up corporations in tax havens.  
 
Other countries followed suit. After the relaxation of exchange controls in the 1980s, 
most developed countries and many developing ones adopted Foreign Investment Fund 
(FIF) rules that are modeled after the FPHC and PFIC rules. In a globalized world, it is 
impossible to maintain progressivity in the income tax without such a rule. Even purely 
territorial jurisdictions like most Latin American countries found it necessary to adopt 
FIF rules in conjunction with global taxation in the 1990s.  
 
This is therefore another example of constructive unilateralism. The US led, and most of 
the world followed, at least on paper. Unfortunately resource constraints mean that 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3544065
3
Avi-Yonah:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2020
many countries are unable to effectively enforce their FIF rules. However, the rise of 
automatic exchange of information (discussed below) promises to put some more teeth 
into these rules. And the existence of the rules ensures that if people are caught evading 
they can be prosecuted.  
 
c. Controlled Foreign Corporations  
 
Before 1961, no country taxed the foreign source income of subsidiaries of its 
multinationals, because residence countries believed they lacked both source and 
residence jurisdiction over foreign source income of foreign corporations. However, in 
1961 the Kennedy Administration proposed taxing all income of “controlled foreign 
corporations” (CFCs) by using a deemed dividend mechanism that was copied from the 
FPHC rules.  
 
While this proposal was rejected, the resulting compromise (Subpart F, 1962) aimed at 
taxing income of CFCs that was unlikely to be taxed by source countries either because 
it was mobile and could be earned anywhere (passive income) or because it was 
structured to be earned in low-tax jurisdictions (base company income).  
Initially, the adoption of Subpart F seemed to have put US-based multinationals at a 
competitive disadvantage, because no other country had such rules. But gradually this 
picture changed. The US was followed by Germany (1972), Canada (1975), Japan (1978), 
France (1980), United Kingdom (1984), New Zealand (1988), Australia (1990), Sweden 
(1990), Norway (1992), Denmark (1995), Finland (1995), Indonesia (1995), Portugal 
(1995), Spain (1995), Hungary (1997), Mexico (1997), South Africa (1997), South Korea 
(1997), Argentina (1999), Brazil (2000), Italy (2000), Estonia (2000), Israel (2003), Turkey 
(2006), and China (2008). Many other countries, such as India, are considering adopting 
such rules. As a result, most of our trading partners now have CFC rules. 
  
Moreover, the later adopters improved on the US in two principal ways. First, they 
rejected the deemed dividend mechanism, which can lead to many unforeseen 
complications, in favor of taxing the shareholders on a pass-through basis. Second, they 
generally explicitly incorporate the effective foreign tax rate into the determination 
whether a CFC will be subject to current tax. This is better than the US rule that is based 
solely on the type of income, because after 1980 it became quite easy to earn active 
income that is not subject to tax.  
 
The result is that the CFCs of EU-based multinationals are generally subject to tax at 
similar or higher rates than US-based ones, despite the non- taxation of dividends from 
active income under territoriality. This is therefore a classic example of constructive 
unilateralism. The US led and others followed, and the end result is that most 
multinationals are subject to similar effective tax rates, with no competitive 
disadvantage or advantage. The result is a world in which there is much less double non-
taxation than in the absence of CFC rules.  
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Unfortunately, in the US Subpart F was critically undermined before the TCJA by the 
adoption of check the box (discussed below) and the CFC to CFC exception, resulting in 
$3 trillion of low-taxed accumulated earnings offshore by US multinationals. This cannot 
happen in other countries with tougher CFC rules, and is a major part of the explanation 
why despite rampant tax competition most OECD members did not see the sharp drops 
in overall corporate tax revenues that are seen in developing countries.  
 
d. Transfer Pricing 
  
The US first adopted statutory language governing transfer pricing in 1921, and the 
“arm’s length standard” that still applies dates to the 1930s, but both lacked meaningful 
content until the adoption of the original transfer pricing regulations in 1968. These 
regulations incorporated the three “classical” transfer pricing methods of comparable 
uncontrolled price, cost plus and resale price.  
 
By 1977, the OECD adopted transfer pricing guidelines that followed closely  
the three classical methods. These US methods are still the gold standard for transfer 
pricing and are accepted worldwide, including by developing countries that are not 
members of OECD.  
 
By the late 1980s, however, the US became dissatisfied with the classical methods 
because of the difficulty of finding adequate comparables for most transactions. A GAO 
study from 1991 found that over 90% of transfer pricing cases were not resolved on the 
basis of the classical methods. As a result, the US in 1995 adopted two new profit-based 
methods, the Comparable Profits Method and Profit Split, that now govern the majority 
of transfer pricing cases.  
 
Remarkably, the OECD followed with revised transfer pricing guidelines within months 
of the new US regulations, which likewise incorporated the two new methods. There 
was some resistance, however, and initially the new methods were treated as methods 
of last resort (the Germans in particular were concerned about the lower standard of 
comparability in the profit based methods). By the 2000s, however, the OECD changed 
its mind and accepted the new methods as equal to the classical ones. The OECD now 
follows the US “best method rule” under which there is no hierarchy of methods. Other 
countries have likewise followed the new OECD guidelines.  
 
Another example of constructive unilateralism in this context is APAs, a US innovation 
that most countries have now adopted, including multilateral APAs. Despite significant 
critiques due to the secrecy involved, APAs have overall been a positive development 
for tax administrations and multinationals alike.  
 
I have long been a critic of the arm’s length standard, and regret that the US did not 
follow through on legislation adopted by the House of Representatives in 1962 that 
would have shifted the US to global formulary apportionment. The refusal to do so is no 
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doubt another example of the influence of US businesses on US tax policy. And yet, it is 
clear that transfer pricing is an example of constructive unilateralism, because the entire 
world (almost-Brazil is the exception) follows rules that were originally developed by the 
US. While transfer pricing is difficult, the alternative of no rules would have been much 
worse.  
 
e. Limitation on Benefits  
 
The idea of limiting the benefits of treaties to bona fide residents of the treaty countries 
originated with the first US model treaty of 1981. While tax treaties were initially aimed 
at preventing double taxation, by the 1970s it was clear that they frequently were 
enabling double non-taxation to occur because non-treaty country residents could use it 
to reduce taxation at source by setting up corporations as nominal residents of treaty 
countries. The US took the position that source taxation should not be reduced unless 
the income was in fact taxed at residence.  
 
Since 1984, the US has insisted on including LOBs in all of its tax treaties (and also made 
it a treaty override in some contexts). It also has anti-conduit rules in its domestic 
legislation. Other countries were initially reluctant, but had to agree (even the Dutch 
went along, because this was non-negotiable, although the specific LOB in the US-
Netherlands treaty is distinctly more porous than the US model one). Eventually, the 
OECD included a model LOB in the commentary on article 1 of its model treaty, and now 
in the context of BEPS this language will be moved into the article itself, in conjunction 
with a declaration that the primary purpose of the treaty is to prevent both double 
taxation and double non-taxation. Thus, the US view has prevailed and is now generally 
accepted in the treaty context. It is also clear now that the purpose of LOB is not just to 
prevent a “treaty with the world” but to prevent double non-taxation. While some 
countries (e.g., India) still resist, the US view is now the predominant one.  
 
f. Foreign Investment in Real Property  
 
The US adopted FIRPTA in 1980, and made it a treaty override, since it taxes capital 
gains on real property at source contrary to article 13 of the models. The US also 
insisted on applying the tax to sales of stock in US corporations over 50% of whole value 
is US real estate.  
 
The OECD initially resisted, condemning the treaty override in a 1989 report. But then 
other countries began adopting similar provisions by treaty override (e.g., Australia), 
and by now the OECD model has been changed to reflect the US position, including the 
real property holding company rule.  
 
I do not like FIRPTA and would abandon it, because I do not see the point of taxing real 
property and not taxing large participations (the real property is immobile, but 
acquisitions of US companies can lead to outward migration of IP). Moreover, the 
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FIRPTA tax can be avoided by, e.g., holding the real property through a foreign 
corporation and selling the shares. Nevertheless, it is clear that in this case as well the 
US view has been accepted by the rest of the world, which sets great store on taxing 
real property (including minerals) at source.  
 
g. Portfolio Interest Exemption  
 
The US adopted the portfolio interest exemption in 1984, against the background of a 
growing federal deficit and a wish to enable foreign investors to lend to the US 
government and US corporations without being subject to treaty exchange of 
information provisions. This move has generally been seen as a mistake (Charlie McLure, 
one of its authors, has regretted it in public) because it has enabled US residents to 
pretend to be foreigners and escape US tax, and because it generally supports tax 
evasion. Thus it is more an example of destructive than constructive unilateralism. But 
there is no question that it had a major impact on the rest of the world: No country can 
easily afford to impose tax on outbound interest while the biggest market does not. 
Even the EU, which with its Savings Directive has made a serious effort to tax intra-EU 
interest payments, exempts payments to non-EU residents (e.g., US residents, so that 
the US and the EU each aid and abet tax evasion by residents of the other, although this 
may be changing now as a result of FATCA- see below).  
 
h. Branch Profit Tax  
 
The branch profit tax (BPT) is designed to treat branches the same as subsidiaries by 
imposing withholding tax on “dividend equivalent amounts” of the branch, calculated by 
reference to increases or decreases in the branch’s net equity. It is a complicated rule, 
and in my opinion an unnecessary one, since dividends are not deductible and the 
income has been taxed once already at the corporate level (as effectively connected 
income of the branch). Nevertheless, in this case as well other countries (e.g., Germany) 
have adopted similar rules, and they may be perceived as more necessary since 
branches and subsidiaries are more similar with the rise of LLCs and check the box. The 
US has incorporated the BPT in its tax treaties, and the OECD permits it in the OECD 
model.  
 
i. Anti-Hybrid Rules 
  
While the US has committed a spectacular act of destructive unilateralism with check 
the box, it did subsequently adopt an anti-hybrid rule in the treaty context, determining 
that it should not be possible to achieve double non- taxation by having an LLC treated 
as a branch paying interest for US purposes but as a corporation paying exempt 
dividends for Canadian purposes. The Canadians went along even though this too was a 
treaty override, revising the treaty accordingly. Other countries (e.g., the UK) 
subsequently adopted broader anti-hybrid rules. 
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j. FATCA  
 
The most spectacular and impressive recent example of constructive unilateralism is 
FATCA. FATCA was initially adopted in 2010 in response to the UBS case, and on the face 
of it FATCA is just about requiring foreign financial institutions to report accounts 
controlled by US citizens or residents directly to the IRS. Because FATCA had real teeth 
(non-complying FFIs that derive US source income are subject to 30% withholding) and 
because it violated local privacy laws, it initially met with huge resistance. But the US 
Treasury was able to negotiate Intergovernmental Agreements with many countries to 
permit FFIs to transfer the information to their own governments, which would then 
share it under treaties. That, in turn, led to the development of standard information 
exchange rules that culminated in the Multilateral Agreement on Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters (MAATM), which has now been signed by over 100 countries 
(not including the US) and which provides for automatic exchange of information with 
no bank secrecy or dual criminality exceptions.  
 
Thus, a provision that has been widely decried as a unilateral US power grab has now 
led to the most extensive multilateral agreement in tax matters. There is no better 
example of the power of US leadership or of constructive unilateralism.  
 
3. BEPS 1 and the 2016 US Model 
 
Following FATCA, the next major development in international taxation was BEPS 1, 
from 2013 to 2015. While the US participated in BEPS 1, it was not the leader, ceding 
this role to the EU. The main reason was that the Great Recession was more severe in 
the EU than in the US and the austerity policies adopted by EU government led to public 
pressure on politicians to ensure than MNEs pay adequate tax. No such public pressure 
developed in the US despite similar Congressional hearings (compare, e.g., the 
Starbucks case in the UK to the Apple hearing in the US Senate- Starbucks was 
condemned for legally reducing its UK tax while Apple was celebrated for doing the 
same in the US). 
 
a. BEPS 1. 
 
BEPS 1 was an implementation of the single tax principle, which underlay US 
international taxation from 1918 to 1981 but was mostly forgotten in the US in the era 
of tax competition, the portfolio interest exemption and check the box. In turn, it 
influenced the US, as can be seen in the 2016 version of the US model. 
 
The reliance of BEPS 1 on the single tax principle can be seen from the new preamble to 
the OECD model tax treaty:  
 
(State A) and (State B)...Intending to conclude a Convention for the elimination of 
double taxation with respect to taxes on income and on capital without creating 
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opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or 
avoidance...(emphasis added)  
 
This language embodies the OECD and G20’s official commitment to preventing both 
double taxation and double non- taxation, i.e., to the single tax principle.  
  
In introducing the final BEPS package on October 5, 2015, OECD Secretary General Angel 
Gurria stated that:  
 
“Base erosion and profit shifting affects all countries, not only economically, but also as 
a matter of trust. BEPS is depriving countries of precious resources to jump-start 
growth, tackle the effects of the global economic crisis and create more and better 
opportunities for all. But beyond this, BEPS has been also eroding the trust of citizens in 
the fairness of tax systems worldwide. The measures we are presenting today represent 
the most fundamental changes to international tax rules in almost a century: they will 
put an end to double non-taxation, facilitate a better alignment of taxation with 
economic activity and value creation, and when fully implemented, these measures will 
render BEPS-inspired tax planning structures ineffective”.  
  
While this is no doubt over optimistic, it is clear that BEPS 1 was intended to implement 
the single tax principle. This goal can be seen in all of the BEPS action steps:  
 
Action 1: Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy  
 
This step is designed to address the ability of multinationals to avoid taxation of active 
income at source by selling goods and services into an economy without having a PE. In 
a world in which most residence jurisdictions exempt or defer taxation of active income 
changing the PE physical presence standard is essential to prevent double non-taxation.  
 
Action 2: Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements 
  
This step is obviously designed to address double non- taxation by limiting tax arbitrage 
transactions designed to utilize hybrid mismatches to create double non-taxation. Check 
the box is a target.  
 
Action 3: Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules  
 
This step is intended to enforce effective residence-based taxation of income that is not 
taxed at source by limiting the scope of exemption and deferral to income that is subject 
to source based taxation.  
 
Action 4: Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial 
Payments  
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This step is designed to enforce source based taxation of active income by limiting 
interest and related deductions that erode the corporate tax base without 
corresponding inclusions at residence.  
 
Action 5: Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account 
Transparency and Substance  
 
This step is intended to reinforce source based taxation of active income by putting 
limits on harmful tax competition involving special regimes like patent boxes and 
cashboxes, and by requiring real investment that raises the transaction costs.  
 
Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances  
 
This action adopts the US LOB position that treaty benefits should not result in 
reduction of tax at source unless there is effective taxation at residence, including a 
“primary purpose test” that states that the purpose of treaties is to prevent both double 
taxation and double non-taxation.  
 
Action 7: Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status  
 
This action reinforces source based taxation of active income and prevents the Shifting 
of such income into low tax jurisdictions through commissionaire and similar 
arrangements.  
 
Actions 8-10: Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation  
 
These actions build on earlier OECD work by limiting the ability to shift income to low 
tax jurisdictions by transfer pricing.  
 
Action 11: Measuring and Monitoring BEPS  
 
This action attempts to incentivize governments to act on BEPS by measuring its 
Magnitude (between $100 and $240 billion reach year in tax avoided).  
 
Action 12: Mandatory Disclosure Rules  
 
This action seeks to prevent secret rulings that enable multinationals to pay very low 
effective tax rate in countries that appear to have high corporate tax rates.  
 
Action 13: Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country 
Reporting  
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This action seems to bolster transfer pricing by requiring country by country reporting 
by multinationals, so that tax avoidance can be measured and source taxation of active 
income upheld.  
 
Action 14: Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective  
This action builds on previous OECD work on mandatory arbitration in tax treaties to 
prevent double taxation. It is a necessary corollary to the steps that limit double non- 
taxation.  
 
Action 15: Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties  
 
This action is intended to improve coordination of the previous steps.  
 
Overall BEPS 1 was a very impressive achievement in a very short span of time. While 
BEPS will not eliminate double non-taxation any time soon, it demonstrated significant 
political commitment by the G20 and OECD to the single tax principle. It builds on earlier 
OECD actions like the commentary on article 1 that incorporates LOB principles, and 
that according to OECD applies to all treaties that include article 1, which is every tax 
treaty.  
 
b.  The New US Model (2016) 
 
Anticipating the outcome of BEPS, the US in May 2015 released several proposed 
amendments to its model tax treaty, all of which are consistent with the single tax 
principle. Clearly, in this case the influence was in the opposite direction: These changes 
implement BEPS 1, which was not led by the US.  
 
1. Treaty Exempt PEs  
 
New Article 1 Section 7 excludes from the withholding tax reductions of the treaty 
payments to a permanent establishment of a company of the treaty partner in a third 
state if— 
 
the profits of that permanent establishment are subject to a combined aggregate 
effective rate of tax in the [treaty partner state] and the state in which the permanent 
establishment is situated of less than 60 percent of the general rate of company tax 
applicable in the [treaty partner state]  
 
or if the PE is situated in a third state that does not have a tax treaty with the US and the 
PE is not subject to tax in the treaty partner.  
 
This provision is intended to prevent treaty benefits to accruing to a company resident 
in a treaty party that applies territoriality so as to exclude the profits of branches in low-
tax jurisdiction. The effect of the provision would be to impose full 30% withholding on 
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payments to such branches, consistently with the single tax principle and with the 
branch rule of Subpart F.  
 
2. Expanded LOB  
 
The new LOB article is a significant tightening of existing LOB rules. For example, the 
requirement that if a company is traded on a stock exchange, that stock exchange must 
be in the same country that the company is in, is intended to address “inversion” 
transactions in which US companies inverted to Bermuda, had the board meet in 
Barbados to qualify under the US-Barbados treaty, and claimed exemption from LOB 
because they were publicly traded on the NYSE.  
 
In addition, similarly to the 1981 LOB, treaty benefits are denied to a company unless—  
ii) with respect to benefits under this Convention other than under Article 10 
(Dividends), less than 50 percent of the company’s gross income, and less than 50 
percent of the tested group’s gross income, is paid or accrued, directly or indirectly, in 
the form of payments that are deductible for purposes of the taxes covered by this 
Convention in the company’s Contracting State of residence (but not including arm’s 
length payments in the ordinary course of business for services or tangible property), 
either to persons that are not residents of either Contracting State entitled to the 
benefits of this Convention under subparagraph (a), (b), (c) or (e) of this paragraph or to 
persons that meet this requirement but that benefit from a special tax regime in their 
Contracting State of residence with respect to the deductible payment. (emphasis 
added).  
 
“Special tax regime” is a newly defined term:  
l) the term “special tax regime” with respect to an item of income or profit means any 
legislation, regulation or administrative practice that provides a preferential effective 
rate of taxation to such income or profit, including through reductions in the tax rate 
or the tax base. With regard to interest, the term special tax regime includes notional 
deductions that are allowed with respect to equity. However, the term shall not include 
any legislation, regulation or administrative practice:  
i) the application of which does not disproportionately benefit interest, royalties or 
other income, or any combination thereof;  
ii) that, with regard to royalties, satisfies a substantial activity requirement;  
iii) that implements the principles of Article 7 (Business Profits) or Article 9 (Associated 
Enterprises);  
iv) that applies principally to persons that exclusively promote religious, charitable, 
scientific, artistic, cultural or educational activities;  
v) that applies principally to persons substantially all of the activity of which is to provide 
or administer pension or retirement benefits;  
vi) that facilitates investment in entities that are marketed primarily to retail investors, 
are widely-held, that hold real property (immovable property), a diversified portfolio of 
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securities, or any combination thereof, and that are subject to investor-protection 
regulation in the Contracting State in which the investment entity is established; or  
vii) that the Contracting States have agreed shall not constitute a special tax regime 
because it does not result in a low effective rate of taxation (emphasis added).  
 
This means that the withholding tax reductions of the treaty will not apply to a company 
50% or more of its income (or of the income of its consolidated group) is paid in 
deductible payments either to residents of third countries or to a company in the treaty 
partner country that is subject to a low effective tax rate because of a “special tax 
regime.” As in the 1981 LOB, this provision makes it clear that the purpose of the LOB is 
to enforce the single tax principle, not just to prevent a treaty with the world.  
 
3. Anti-inversion rules.  
 
New language is added to articles 10, 11, 12 and 21 to the effect that dividends, 
interest, royalties and other income paid by an “expatriated entity” can be subject to 
30% withholding tax for a period of ten years after the inversion that created it. Since 
most “second wave” inversions are to treaty jurisdictions and the treaty is essential to 
the purpose of the inversion, which is to generate double non-taxation by stripping 
earnings out of the US into low tax jurisdictions (e.g., through the Netherlands or 
Ireland, as in the infamous double Irish Dutch sandwich), this will be a significant blow 
to inversions when it is included in actual treaties.  
 
4. Special Tax Regimes  
 
The newly defined “special tax regime” will, in accordance with the Technical 
Explanation, also prevent reduction of withholding taxes under articles 11, 12 and 21.  
The Technical Explanation provides that:  
 
Subparagraph 1(l) defines the term “special tax regime” with respect to an item of 
income. The term is used in Articles 11 (Interest), 12 (Royalties), and 21 (Other Income), 
each of which denies treaty benefits to items of income if the resident of the other 
Contracting State (the residence State) beneficially owning the interest, royalties, or 
other income, is related to the payor of such income, and benefits from a special tax 
regime in its residence State with respect to the particular category of income. This rule 
allows the Contracting State in which the item of income arises to retain its right to tax 
the income under its domestic law if the resident benefits from a regime in the 
residence State with respect to a category of income that includes the item of income 
that results in low or no taxation. The term “special tax regime” also is used in Article 22 
(Limitation on Benefits) for the purposes of the so-called “derivative benefits” rule in 
paragraph 4 of that Article.  
 
The application of the term “special tax regime” in Articles 11, 12 and 21 is consistent 
with the tax policy considerations that are relevant to the decision to enter into a tax 
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treaty, or to amend an existing tax treaty, as articulated by the Commentary to the 
OECD Model, as amended by the Base Erosion and Profits Shifting initiative. In 
particular, paragraph 15.2 of the introduction of the OECD Model now provides:  
“Since a main objective of tax treaties is the avoidance of double taxation in order to 
reduce tax obstacles to cross- border services, trade and investment, the existence of 
risks of double taxation resulting from the interaction of the tax systems of the two 
States involved will be the primary tax policy concern. Such risks of double taxation will 
generally be more important where there is a significant level of existing or projected 
cross-border trade and investment between two States. Most of the provisions of tax 
treaties seek to alleviate double taxation by allocating taxing rights between two States 
and it is assumed that where a State accepts treaty provisions that restrict its right to 
tax elements of income, it generally does so on the understanding that these elements 
of income are taxable in the other State. Where a State levies no or low income taxes, 
other States should consider whether there are risks of double taxation that would 
justify, by themselves, a tax treaty. States should also consider whether there are 
elements of another State’s tax system that could increase the risk of non-taxation, 
which may include tax advantages that are ring-fenced from the domestic economy.” 
  
The term “special tax regime” means any legislation, regulation, or administrative 
practice that provides a preferential effective rate of taxation to interest, royalties or 
other income, including through reductions in the tax rate or tax base. In the case of 
interest, the term includes any legislation, regulation, or administrative practice, 
whether or not generally available, that provides notional deductions with respect to 
equity. For purposes of this definition, an administrative practice includes a ruling 
practice.  
 
For example, if a taxpayer obtains a ruling providing that its foreign source interest 
income will be subject to a low rate of taxation in the residence State, and that rate is 
lower than the rate that generally would apply to foreign source interest income 
received by residents of that State, the administrative practice under which the ruling is 
obtained is a special tax regime.  
 
Paragraph 2 of the Protocol provides a list of the legislation, regulations, and 
administrative practices existing in the other Contracting State at the time of the 
signature of the Convention that the Contracting States agree are “special tax regimes” 
within the meaning of paragraph 1(l) of Article 3.  
 
This is clearly consistent with the single tax principle and with the original US LOB of 
1981, which has been eroded in subsequent versions but is now returning with full force 
to deny treaty benefits (reductions in source taxation) in cases that the effective tax rate 
at residence is too low.  
 
5. Subsequent Changes. 
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A new article 28 provides that— 
 
1. If at any time after the signing of this Convention, the general rate of company tax 
applicable in either Contracting State falls below 15 percent with respect to substantially 
all of the income of resident companies, or either Contracting State provides an 
exemption from taxation to resident companies for substantially all foreign source 
income (including interest and royalties), the provisions of Articles 10 (Dividends), 11 
(Interest), 12 (Royalties) and 21 (Other Income) may cease to have effect pursuant to 
paragraph 4 of this Article for payments to companies resident in both Contracting 
States.  
2. If at any time after the signing of this Convention, the highest marginal rate of 
individual tax applicable in either Contracting State falls below 15 percent with respect 
to substantially all income of resident individuals, or either Contracting State provides 
an exemption from taxation to resident individuals for substantially all foreign source 
income (including interest and royalties), the provisions of Articles 10, 11, 12 and 21 
may cease to have effect pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article for payments to 
individuals resident in either Contracting State.  
3. For purposes of this Article:  
a) the allowance of generally available deductions based on a percentage of what 
otherwise would be taxable income, or other similar mechanisms to achieve a reduction 
in the overall rate of tax, shall be taken into account for purposes of determining the 
general rate of company tax or the highest marginal rate of individual tax, as 
appropriate; and  
b) a tax that applies to a company only upon a distribution by such company, or that 
applies to shareholders, shall not be taken into account in determining the general rate 
of company tax.  
4. If the provisions of either paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of this Article are satisfied by 
changes in law in one of the Contracting States, the other Contracting State may notify 
the first- mentioned Contracting State through diplomatic channels that it will cease to 
apply the provisions of Articles 10, 11, 12 and 21. In such case, the provisions of such 
Articles shall cease to have effect in both Contracting States with respect to payments to 
resident individuals or companies, as appropriate, six months after the date of such 
written notification, and the Contracting States shall consult with a view to concluding 
amendments to this Convention to restore an appropriate allocation of taxing rights.  
The Technical Explanation provides that--  
The negotiation of the Convention took into account the desire of the two Contracting 
States to allocate taxing rights between them in a manner that would alleviate double 
taxation that could otherwise result if cross-border income, profit or gain were taxed 
under the domestic laws of the two Contracting States. The Contracting States recognize 
that certain subsequent changes to the domestic laws of one or both of the Contracting 
States that lower taxation could reduce the risk of double taxation but in addition 
increase the risk that the Convention would give rise to unwanted instances of low or no 
taxation. In addition, such subsequent changes in law could draw into question the 
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continued appropriateness of the allocation of taxing rights that was originally 
negotiated in the Convention. 
  
Article 28 addresses this possibility by providing that if, at any time after the signing of 
the Convention, either Contracting State enacts certain changes to domestic law that 
could implicate the terms of the Convention, certain benefits of the Convention may 
cease to have effect, and if so the Contracting States shall consult with a view to  
amending the Convention in a way that would restore an appropriate allocation of 
taxing rights.  
 
Article 28 is consistent with the tax policy considerations that are relevant to the 
decision to enter into a tax treaty, or to amend an existing tax treaty, as articulated by 
the Commentary to the OECD Model, as amended by the Base Erosion and Profits 
Shifting initiative.  
 
Once again the consistency of this provision with the single tax principle is explicit. The 
goal is to address subsequent harmful tax competition provisions that erode residence- 
based taxation in the treaty partner.  
 
Overall these provisions show that the current US model was heavily influenced by BEPS 
1, rather than the other way around.  
 
 
4. The TCJA 
 
The TCJA was originally driven by the desire of the US MNEs to adopt a participation 
exemption and enable them to repatriate their “trapped income”, which by 2017 
amounted to about $3 trillion. This in turn was explicitly based on the fact that most 
other OECD countries had such an exemption, and in particular that Japan and the UK 
had recently switched to an exemption from worldwide taxation. Thus, in this case the 
US was explicitly the follower and not the leader.  
 
Much of the rest of the TCJA followed because (a) domestic US corporations wanted a 
rate cut that will compensate them from not having exempt foreign income, and (b) 
pass throughs wanted a rate cut to compensate them for not being corporations. The 
combination of these steps (the participation exemption, cutting the corporate rate 
from 35% to 21%, and the 199A deduction) led to massive revenue losses, and that in 
turn required revenue raisers to keep the ten year cost of the overall package below 
$1.5 trillion, as required by the budget resolution underlying reconciliation (which was 
necessary to avoid a Senate filibuster). Much of the revenue came from the 
international provisions in the form of the one time tax on offshore income, GILTI and 
BEAT, as well as the new limits on the interest deduction that apply both domestically 
and internationally. 
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On the face of it, the participation exemption represents a glaring deviation from the 
“single tax principle”, which underlies BEPS. The single tax principle states that all 
income should be subject to tax once, at the residence country rate if it is passive 
income and at the average source country rate if it is active income. The participation 
exemption violates this principle because it exempts dividends from residence taxation 
even if they were not taxed at source. 
  
But the violation is less blatant than it appears. First, the participation exemption only 
applies to 10% corporate shareholders. Portfolio US investors still are taxed on foreign 
source dividends. Moreover, when the US parent distributes a dividend to its taxable US 
shareholders or buys back their shares, the distribution is fully taxable at the 
dividend/capital gains rate of 23.8%.  
 
Second, in conjunction with adopting the participation exemption, TCJA significantly 
strengthened Subpart F. Specifically, IRC section 951A now currently taxes US parents of 
controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) on their “global intangible low-taxed income”, or 
GILTI, at a 10.5% rate. GILTI is defined broadly as any income that exceeds a 10% return 
on the CFCs’ basis in their tangible assets (the “hurdle rate”), with a credit for foreign 
taxes. Thus, the US parents of CFCs are effectively subject to a minimum tax of  
10.5% on their offshore earnings that exceeds the hurdle rate. The tax on GILTI is 
consistent with the single tax principle because contrary to pre-TCJA law it ensures that 
offshore earnings that exceed the hurdle rate are taxed at 10.5%, and that a residence-
based tax applies to those earnings to the extent they are not taxed at source.  
 
Third, there is a new anti-base erosion anti-abuse tax (BEAT) imposed at 10% on 
deductible payments made by US corporations to their foreign affiliates (which can be 
foreign parents or CFCs). The BEAT upholds the single tax principle because it imposes 
tax at source under circumstances where they may not be a tax at residence.  
 
Because of these and other provisions of the TCJA, it can actually be seen as more 
consistent with the single tax principle than previous law. On the outbound front, prior 
law permitted US-based multinationals to accumulate over $3 trillion in low tax 
jurisdictions offshore without current US or foreign tax, which was a blatant violation of 
the single tax principle. On the inbound front, prior law only had a weak limit of interest 
deductions to foreign related parties, so that massive earnings stripping out of the US 
could occur.  
 
The following sections describe first the relevant inbound provisions of TCJA and then 
the outbound provisions.  
 
1. Inbound Taxation  
 
a. The BEAT.  
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The most important innovation in TCJA is the BEAT. Under new IRC section 59A, US 
corporate taxpayers have to pay a “base erosion anti-abuse tax” (BEAT), at 10% less any 
applicable credits (including the foreign tax credit, but the US taxpayer is unlikely to 
have them for the relevant income since any foreign tax is imposed on the foreign 
related party). The tax base is taxable income plus “base erosion payments”, defined as 
any amount paid or accrued by a taxpayer to a foreign person that is a related party of 
the taxpayer and with respect to which a deduction is allowable, including interest (to 
the extent not otherwise disallowed) and, for inverted corporations, also cost of goods 
sold. Withholding taxes (if any) are allowed as an offset. There is a safe harbor for 
smaller corporations with gross receipts below $500 million and another for base 
erosion payments of less than 3%. The proposal applies to base erosion payments paid 
or accrued in taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017.  
 
On its face, the BEAT does not violate tax treaties because the BEAT is applied only to 
the US party, so that the savings clause applies (US tax treaties Art 1(4): treaties cannot 
change US taxation of US residents). However, it could be construed as a violation of 
article 24, which is not subject to the savings clause.  
 
However, the BEAT is not different in substance than the UK or Australian diverted 
profits taxes, or from the thin capitalization rules employed by most of our trading 
partners. Nor is it inconsistent with the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive that denies a 
deduction if the income is not subject to tax at residence. The BEAT is an overdue 
response to earnings stripping out of the US, and as such is consistent with the 
OECD/G20 BEPS project and the single tax principle. Note, however, that the BEAT only 
applies to payments to related parties and can be avoided by dealing with customers or 
unrelated distributors.  
 
b. Hybrid payments. 
  
New IRC section 267A limits the deductibility of payments on hybrid instruments 
(treated as deductible in the US and exempt in the residence jurisdiction) or by hybrid 
entities (treated as corporations by the US and transparent in the residence jurisdiction, 
or vice versa). These provisions implement OECD BEPS Action 2 in accordance with the 
single tax principle.  
 
2.  Outbound Taxation  
 
a. Participation Exemption.  
 
New IRC section 245A permits an offsetting deduction of 100% for foreign source 
dividends received by a domestic corporation from a 10% or more owned foreign 
corporation. This provision is similar to the participation exemption used by most of our 
trading partners. It means that US corporate shareholders receiving dividends from the 
non-Subpart F income of CFCs will not be taxed even if that income was not subject to 
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tax at source (e.g., because of a tax holiday) and was not GILTI (because it falls below 
the hurdle rate).  
 
However, IRC 245A(e) disallows the participation exemption for hybrid dividends that 
are treated as deductible payments at source. This is consistent with the single tax 
principle because income that was not taxed at source should be taxed at residence.  
 
b. Interest Limits.  
 
New IRC 163(j) (which replaces the old earning stripping rule) limits the deduction of net 
interest expense of a business to 30% of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). This 
limit is necessary to prevent tax sheltering by using borrowed funds to invest in stock of 
CFCs generating exempt dividends. It is directly copied from the German and UK interest 
limitations. However, even allowing 30% of the interest deduction can still generate 
negative tax rates. For example: Corporate taxpayer borrows 100 and invests in a CFC 
that distributes a dividend of 10. Interest payments are 10 and 3 are deductible under 
section 163(j). Before tax this results in a return of 10-10=0. After tax, since the dividend 
is exempt and 3 of interest are deductible against other income, the return is negative 3.  
 
c. GILTI.  
 
TCJA and new IRC sections 951A and 250 provide that a U.S. shareholder of any CFC 
must include in gross income for a taxable year its GILTI in a manner generally similar to 
inclusions of subpart F income. GILTI means, with respect to any U.S. shareholder for 
the shareholder’s taxable year, the excess (if any) of the shareholder’s net “CFC tested 
income” over the shareholder’s “net deemed tangible income return.” The 
shareholder’s “net deemed tangible income return” is an amount equal to 10 percent of 
the aggregate of the shareholder’s pro rata share of the qualified business asset 
investment (“QBAI”) of each CFC with respect to which it is a U.S. shareholder. “Net CFC 
tested income” means, with respect to any U.S. shareholder, the excess of the 
aggregate of its pro rata share of the tested income of each CFC over the aggregate of 
its pro rata share of the tested loss of each CFC. The tested income of a CFC means the 
excess of the gross income of the corporation determined without regard to certain 
exceptions (including the current active finance exception and the CFC look-through 
rule) over deductions (including taxes) properly allocable to such gross income. QBAI 
means, with respect to any CFC for a taxable year, the average of the aggregate of its 
adjusted bases, determined as of the close of each quarter of the taxable year, in 
specified tangible property used in the production of tested income in its trade or 
business and of a type with respect to which a deduction is generally allowable under 
section 167.  
 
The tax rate of future GILTI is determined by taking the US tax rate (21%) and allowing a 
deduction of 50%, for a net rate of 10.5%. This rate can be partially offset by foreign tax 
credits, but in a separate basket (but with cross-averaging within the basket). The 
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section is effective for taxable years of foreign corporations beginning after December 
31, 2017.  
 
What this means in plain English is that Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, Netflix, and 
their ilk will have to pay tax at 10.5% on future GILTI because they have CFCs that 
produce “tested income” (and no loss) in excess of 10% over their basis in offshore 
tangible assets, which is zero or close to it (since they derive almost all of their income 
from intangibles). Other MNEs (e.g., GE or Intel) will pay less because they have more 
tangible assets offshore. This creates an obvious incentive to move jobs (not just profits) 
offshore. In addition, the proposal standing on its own would also induce profit shifting 
because of the combination of the participation exemption and the lower rate (10.5% is 
less than 21%). It may also cause inversions to avoid the minimum tax on GILTI.  
 
d. FDII.  
 
To address the problem of shifting income from the US to CFCs, new IRC section 250 
applies a reduced 13.125% to “foreign derived intangible income” (FDII) which is defined 
as the amount which bears the same ratio to the corporation’s “deemed intangible 
income” as its “foreign- derived deduction eligible income” bears to its “deduction 
eligible income.”  
 
Deemed intangible income is the excess of a domestic corporation’s deduction eligible 
income (gross income without regard to subpart F income, GILTI, and other enumerated 
categories) over its deemed tangible income return (10% of its QBAI).  
The “foreign-derived deduction eligible income” is defined as income derived in 
connection with (1) property that is sold by the taxpayer to any foreign person for a 
foreign use or (2) services to any foreign person or with respect to foreign property. In 
other words, this category comprises exports for property and services, including 
royalties from the licensing of intangibles.  
 
Deduction eligible income is essentially the domestic corporation’s modified gross 
income calculated without regard to subpart F and GILTI (as well as a few other 
enumerated categories). So a U.S. company’s foreign derived intangible income, which 
gets the 13.125% rate, is the amount that bears the same ratio to the deemed intangible 
income as the U.S. company’s exports bear to its modified gross income.  
 
e. Foreign Tax Credits.  
 
The TCJA abolishes the indirect credit (IRC section 902) and limits the availability of the 
direct credit (IRC section 901) on dividends that qualify for the participation exemption. 
However, indirect credits under IRC section 960 are retained for GILTI, except that only 
80% of the foreign tax may be credited. This is result in a full offset of the 10.5% 
minimum tax on GILTI if the foreign rate is 13.125%%.  
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In addition, cross crediting is permitted, which creates an incentive to invest in high tax 
foreign jurisdictions. Assume a US taxpayer with 100 income from a low tax foreign 
jurisdiction that exceeds the GILTI hurdle rate. If the taxpayer derives another 100 from 
the US, it will pay 21 on the US income and 10.5 on GILTI for a total of 31.5. But if it 
earns 100 from a foreign jurisdiction with a tax rate of 26.25, then it will only pay 26.25 
because it will have foreign tax credits of 26.25x80%=21 to eliminate its US tax on GILTI 
(10.5%x200).  
 
3. THE TCJA and BEPS 1 
 
From 2013 to 2015, the US participated in BEPS1. However, the general view in the US is 
that following the conclusion of the BEPS negotiations and the change of Administration 
in 2017, the US stepped back from the BEPS process. While the EU was charging ahead 
with implementing BEPS through the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD), the US stated 
that it was already in compliance with all BEPS minimum standards and therefore other 
than Country by Country (CBC) reporting it had no further BEPS obligations. The US 
refused to join the Multilateral Instrument (MLI) to implement BEPS into tax treaties, 
and did not join the common reporting standards (CRS) to further automatic exchange 
of information, leading the EU to call it a tax haven. The US did adopt BEPS provisions in 
its model tax treaty, but those have not been implemented in any actual US treaty. 
Thus, most observers believe that the US has abandoned the BEPS effort.  
 
But this view is wrong. TCJA clearly relies on BEPS principles and in particular on the 
single tax principle. This represents a triumph for the G20/OECD and is incongruent with 
the generally held view that the US will never adopt BEPS. This can be seen in both the 
outbound and inbound provisions of the TCJA.  
 
For outbound transactions, GILTI means that Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, Netflix, 
and their ilk will have to pay tax at 10.5% on future GILTI because they have CFCs that 
produce “tested income” (and no loss) in excess of 10% over their basis in offshore 
tangible assets, which is zero or close to it (since they derive almost all of their income 
from intangibles). This imposes residence taxation in cases where there is no or low 
taxation at source. For inbound transactions, the BEAT means that a minimum tax of 
10% will apply to many payments to foreign related parties. This imposes source 
taxation where there may not be taxation at residence.  
 
TCJA also contains two anti-hybrid provisions that directly implement the single tax 
principle, similarly to the ATAD. The first, IRC 245A(e), disallows the participation 
exemption for hybrid dividends that are treated as deductible payments at source. The 
second, IRC section 267A, limits the deductibility of payments on hybrid instruments or 
to hybrid entities. These provisions clearly implement OECD BEPS Action 2 in accordance 
with the single tax principle.  
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Overall, The TCJA contains multiple provisions that incorporate the principles of the 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) into domestic US tax law. Together 
with the changes in the 2016 model US tax treaty, these provisions mean that the US is 
following the EU and China in implementing BEPS and in particular its underlying 
principle, the single tax principle (i.e., all income should be subject to tax once: passive 
income at the residence state rate and active income at a minimum source tax rate). 
This represents a triumph for the G20/OECD and is incongruent with the generally held 
view that the US will never adopt BEPS.  
 
5. Conclusion: BEPS 2, 2018- 
 
As developed by the OECD, BEPS 2 has two pillars. Pillar 1 is the extension of BEPS 1 
action 1, dealing with the digital economy. It is still in process but what has been 
revealed so far envisages far reaching changes to the international tax regime, primarily 
by partially abandoning the arm’s length principle (ALP) and the permanent 
establishment threshold (PE). Neither of these changes are driven by the US, and it 
remains to be seen whether they will succeed in averting the widespread adoption of 
digital services taxes (DSTs) intended to impose some tax burden on US MNEs. 
 
Pillar 2, on the other hand, is a direct extension of the TCJA. The GLOBE proposal builds 
on GILTI and BEAT in implementing the single tax principle by (a) requiring residence 
taxation at a minimum rate if the source country does not impose tax and (b) denying 
deductions at source if the residence country does not tax.   
 
Both Pillar 2 proposals represent an improvement over the TCJA. The residence based 
proposal is an improvement over GILTI if it denies cross crediting, which fosters tax 
competition. The source based proposal is an improvement over BEAT because it 
explicitly links the denial of deductions to whether the income is taxed at residence, 
which the BEAT does not do. 
 
Thus, the current state of affairs can be characterized as a constructive dialogue: The 
OECD moves (BEPS 1), the US responds (TCJA), the OECD moves again (BEPS 2). 
Hopefully BEPS 2 will succeed and the US will then go along and amend the TCJA as well 
as adopt the changes envisaged in pillar 1. From this kind of dialectic, a new 
international tax regime fit for the 21st century may emerge.  
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